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In August 2010 the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) imposed a prohibition on importation 
of seal products into the EU and marketing of seal products within the EU.
1
 The regulations 
imposing the prohibition will hereinafter be referred to as “the seal regime”. In this master 
thesis it will be examined whether the seal regime’s prohibition is in accordance with the 
EU’s obligations towards its trading partners under the agreements of the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter “WTO”). 
This has become a question after Canada and Norway claimed the seal regime to be 
inconsistent with the EU’s WTO obligations. Both countries asked separately for 
consultations with the EU in late 2009. Neither of the consultations led to agreements and 
both Canada and Norway requested the establishment of Dispute Settlement Panels.
2
 Panels 
were established in the two disputes, and in April 2011 it was decided that the disputes were 
to go in front of one single panel.
3
 The dispute “European Communities-Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products” is waiting to be tried in front of 
a WTO dispute settlement panel.
4 
The theme was chosen because of its current relevance and because of the importance of the 
answer to the question posed. The debate over trade in seal products has been ongoing since 
1983 when the EU prohibited importation and trade in seal pups products, but has since the 
extension of the prohibition in the seal regime become more relevant and important.
5
  
One of the main questions in the debate has been the weight of the seal regime’s underlying 
interests against WTO Members’ interests in compliance with the WTO agreements. In 
answering whether the seal regime is inconsistent with WTO law, the objectives of the seal 
regime and the WTO agreements will be central. In the following it will be given an 
                                                          
1
 Regulation 1007/2009/EC Adopted September 16th 2009, entered in to force August 20
th
 2010 
   Regulation 737/2010/EU Adopted August 10
th




Request for Consultations by Canada, document number 09-5994 (November 4th 2009), Request for 
Consultations by Norway, document number 09-5572 (November 10th 2009)  
Request for the establishment of a Panel by Canada, document number 11-0756 (February 14th 2011), Request 
for the establishment of a Panel by Norway, document number 11- 1301 (March 15th 2011) 
3
 Summary of European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
4
 Canada has another dispute in the WTO, WT/DS369, with EU concerning EU Member’s legislation on trade in 
seal products. 
5
 Council Directive 83/129/EEC Adopted March 28
th
 1983 (in 1983 it was the “European Communities”) 
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introduction to the seal regime, to the relevant WTO agreements and to dispute resolution 
within the WTO. 
 
1.1 The seal regime 
 
The seal regime consists of regulation EC No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Trade in Seal Products (hereinafter “the basic regulation”) and Commission 
Regulation EU 737/2010 on implementation of EC 1007/2009 (hereinafter “the implementing 
regulation”).
6 
The basic regulation lays down an almost complete prohibition on importation 
of seal products into the EU and the marketing of seal products within the EU. The 
implementing regulation stipulates more detailed rules on the prohibition and its exceptions, 
as well as rules of implementation.  
The prohibition on importation and marketing of seal products was explained by a need to 
protect seals from the seal hunt. The EU’s objective is to enhance seal welfare through 
diminishing seal hunt. The EU seeks to decrease “the demand leading to the marketing of seal 
products and, hence, the economic demand driving the commercial hunting of seals”.
7
 The 
EU is not opposed to the hunt in general, but its results which they claim are distress, fear and 
other forms of suffering caused to the seals.
 8
 The EU has found the current prohibition to be 
the only way to increase seal welfare.
 9
  
The EU also justifies the seal regime on the grounds of citizen’s moral beliefs. It was the 
citizens of the EU who demanded restrictions on trade in seal products. The concerns of 
citizens of the EU “extend to the killing and skinning of seals as such”.
10
 The seal regime 
seeks to decrease commercial seal hunt in order to protect its citizen’s moral, and the seal 
regime seeks to make the citizens confident that the products they buy do not contain seal. 
The prohibition is not complete, and there are three exceptions allowing the importation and 
marketing of certain seal products. All three are found in the basic regulation and are further 
detailed in the implementing regulation. 
                                                          
6
 Regulation 1007/2009/EC Adopted September 16th 2009, entered in to force August 20
th
 2010 
   Regulation 737/2010/EU Adopted August 10
th




 Basic regulation preamble recital (10) 
8
 The whole paragraph: Basic regulation preamble recital (11) 
9
 Basic regulation preamble recitals (11) and (12) 
10
 Basic regulation preamble recital (10) 
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The first exception is called “the Inuit-exception” and is found in the basic regulation Article 
3 and in the implementing regulation Article 3.  According to the implementing regulation 
seal products can be imported and marketed where it can be proven that the products derives 
from hunts which satisfy all of the following conditions: 
“(a) seal hunts conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities which have a 
tradition of seal hunting in the community and in the geographical region; 
(b) seal hunts the products of which are at least partly used, consumed or processed 
within the communities according to their traditions; 
(c) seal hunts which contribute to the subsistence of the community. 
 
Another exception is the “sustainable management exception”. According to the basic 
regulation Article 3 number 2 “the placing on the market of seal product” is allowed: 
“where the seal products result from by-products of hunting that is regulated by 
national law and conducted for the sole purpose of the sustainable management of 
marine resources. Such placing shall only be allowed on a non-profit basis”. 
To be regarded as hunted for sustainable management, the products must, according to the 
implementing regulation Article 5 criterion (a) derive from hunt conducted under a “natural 
resources management plan which uses scientific population models of marine resources and 
applies the ecosystem-based approach”, and according to criterion (b) not exceed the quota 
established in the natural resource management plan. 
According to the implementing regulation Article 2 number 2 products are hunted on a “non-
profit basis” when the products are placed on the market for a price less than or equal to the 
recovery costs reduced by the amount of any subsidies received in relation to the hunt.  
A last exception is found in the basic regulation Article 3 and in the implementing regulation 
Article 4. This exception concerns goods for the personal use of travelers. These seal products 
are allowed imported with travelers for personal use, but are not allowed to be placed on the 




1.2 The objectives of the WTO agreements relevant for this dispute 
 
Canada and Norway have claimed the seal regime to be contrary to the EU’s obligations 
under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter “TBT Agreement”), the 
Agreement on Agriculture (hereinafter “Agriculture Agreement”) and the General Agreement 
to Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter “GATT 1994”).
11
 All these are agreements within the 
WTO system. 
The current WTO system has developed from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT 1947). The complexity of international trade and the interdependence between 
countries has increased since 1947, and in 1995 the Agreement Establishing the WTO 
(hereinafter “WTO Agreement”) was signed.
12
 The WTO Agreement seeks, according to its 
preamble, through mutually advantageous agreements, to reduce barriers to trade, and to 
eliminate discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. The WTO Agreement 
consists of several distinct agreements regulating different areas of international trade. 
GATT 1994 regulates the area of international trade in goods. This agreement seeks to 
liberalize international trade by reducing tariffs and removing non-tariff barriers to trade. The 
agreement pursues four main objectives, two of which is relevant for this thesis.
13
 The first 
objective relevant for this thesis is the objective of preventing discrimination in trade among 
Members. The second objective here relevant is the prevention of foreign products being 
imposed restrictions, different from those levied on similar domestic products.
14
 It will in this 
thesis be examined whether the seal regime is in breach of provisions reflecting these two 
objectives. Article XX of the agreement expresses that nothing in the agreement shall be 
construed to prevent Members from adopting and enforcing certain policy objectives, and thus 
it must be examined whether the seal regime pursues such policy objectives. 
                                                          
11
According to Request for the establishment of a Panel by Canada, WT/DS400/1 (February 14th 2011) Canada 
claims the seal regime contrary to EU’s obligations under TBT Agreement Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 6.1, 
7.1 -7.5, 8.1 and 8.2, Agriculture Agreement Article 4.2, and GATT 1994 Articles I:1, III:4, XI:1 and XXIII:1 (b).  
According to Request for the establishment of a panel by Norway, WT/DS401/1 (March 15t 2011) Norway has a 
similar claim with the exception of the claim of inconsistency with TBT Agreement Article 7.2  
12
 WTO Secretariat, From GATT To The WTO: The Multilateral Trading System In The New Millennium, Hague 
2000 preface 
13
 The two others objectives are to only allow Members protectionism (protecting domestic products from 
foreign competition) through tariffs, and to prevent Members from increasing the negotiated tariffs. Tariffs are 
not relevant here since the seal regime prohibits importation. 
14
 Inspired by http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/C02.pdf  
8 
 
Another WTO agreement relevant for this thesis is the TBT Agreement. According to the 
preamble of the TBT Agreement it seeks to further the objectives of GATT 1994 in the area 
of technical regulations. The agreement responds to the fact that technical regulations that 
vary from country to country could impose difficulties for producers and exporters. If 
regulations are set arbitrarily, they could be used as an excuse for protectionism, which the 
agreement seeks to prevent. The TBT Agreement further seeks to countervail that technical 
regulations create unnecessary obstacles to trade. At the same time, the agreement provides 
members with the right to implement measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives as long 
as the measures are not more trade-restrictive than necessary.
15
 Under the TBT Agreement it 
will be examined whether the seal regime is a technical regulation creating unnecessary 
obstacles to trade, and whether the seal regime is more favourable to products of certain 
origin. In addition it will be examined whether the seal regime is more trade-restrictive than 
necessary for fulfilling a legitimate policy objective.  
The third agreement relevant for this thesis is the Agriculture Agreement, regulating the area 
of trade in agricultural products. The objectives relevant for this thesis are those of improving 
market access and of ensuring a fairer competition for producers and exporters of agricultural 
products.
16
 In this thesis it will be examined whether the seal regime breaches these objectives 
by imposing restrictions on trade in seal products.   
 
1.3 Dispute Settlement within the WTO 
 
Within the WTO there is a separate agreement governing settlements of disputes; the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter 
“DSU”). According to DSU Article 1.1, read together with Appendix 1, the DSU covers all 
the agreements relevant for this thesis.  
According to the WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 Members must ensure that their laws and 
regulations are in compliance with WTO law. The parties are obliged to follow the rules laid 
                                                          
15
 Preamble of TBT Agreement, and information on the TBT Agreement 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm 
16




down in the agreements and it is not possible to derogate from these rules.
17
 Members who 
seek the redress of other Member’s violation of WTO obligations can, according to DSU 
Article 23, invoke the dispute settlement system. The DSU is referred to as the backbone of 
the WTO, because it helps to ensure that Members comply with their WTO obligations.
18 
The EU has claimed that the WTO is not the proper forum for Norway’s complaint, since they 
have regional trade agreement (hereinafter “RTA”) with each other. However, within the 
WTO system it is clear that a RTA does not preclude a Member from invoking the DSU.
19
  
According to DSU Article 2.1 it is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
20
 who has the 
authority to establish panels.
21
 In disputes the parties provide evidence and the panel may call 
experts on different subjects to give statements. In a WTO dispute it is the party asserting the 
claim that bear the burden of proof,
 
 and the panels or the Appellate Body,
22
 examine whether 
it has been proven that a measure is WTO-inconsistent.
 23
 When a report from a panel or the 
Appellate Body has been adopted by the DSB, the findings are binding on the parties. 
 
 
1.4 Sources of Law 
 
Panels and the Appellate Body shall interpret and clarify the WTO provisions claimed 
breached, pursuant to DSU Article 3, “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law”.
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is acknowledged as 
                                                          
17
 Sharif Bhuiyan, National Law in WTO law: Effectiveness and Good Governance in the World Trading System, 
Cambridge 2007 page 33 
18
 Andrew T Guzman and Joost H.B Pauwelyn, International Trade Law, United States 2005 page 150 
19
 “in the context of a dispute between two WTO Members involving situations covered by both an RTA and the 
WTO Agreement, any WTO Member which considers that any of its WTO benefits have been nullified or 
impaired has the absolute right to trigger the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and to request the 
establishment of a panel.”
 
Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau “Overlaps And Conflicts Of Jurisdiction Between 
The WTO And RTAS” Conference on Regional Trade Agreements WTO, 26 April 2002) Paragraph 54 
20
 The WTO Council Meeting 
21
 The composition of a Panel is governed by DSU Article 8. Panels consist of three or five the panellists that are 
experts on the field of international law. The panellist are to be chosen in consultation with the parties of 
dispute, if the parties do not agree, the WTO director-general appoint the panellists. 
22
 A permanent seven-member Appellate Body is established by the DSB. Three Appellate Body members serve 
on any one case. The members broadly represented the range of WTO members, and are individuals with 
recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not affiliated with any government 
23
 Appellate Body Report on Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper 
WT/DS44/AB/R (adopted April 22
nd
 1998), paragraph 10.372 
10 
 
customary international law regarding rules for interpreting treaties, and its rules of 




Precedents, in form of the stare decisis doctrine, do not exist within the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System.
 25
 However, the Appellate Body has found prior practice to be relevant 
when interpreting WTO provisions. The Appellate Body has found that panels are expected to 
follow previous decisions by the Appellate Body.
26
 For panel reports the Appellate Body 
expressed that they could be used as sources of law, where relevant, in any dispute.
27
 For 
unadopted panel reports the Appellate Body found that, even though they have no legal status 
in the WTO system, panels “could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an 
unadopted panel report that it considered to be relevant”.
28
 This means that previous reports 
are important sources of law within the WTO system. 
 
 
1.5 The continuation of the thesis 
 
In the following the relevant provisions will be interpreted after the customary law on 
interpretation and the rules prescribed in the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. In 
addition, where the Appellate Body or a Panel has interpreted the provisions, their 
interpretation will be used as a basis for my interpretation. The use of their interpretations are  
justified on the grounds that their interpretations also are based on customary laws of 
interpretation, on the grounds of previous reports being important sources of law, and finally, 
on the grounds that the authors of these reports are experts on WTO law. 
 
                                                          
24
 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, Vienna May 23rd 1969 
25
 A legal principle of determining points in litigation according to precedents 
 Pursuant to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, acknowledged as representing sources of law in 
International Public Law, Article 38 (1) subparagraph (d) judicial decisions are to be subsidiary means for the 
determination of international rules of law 
26
 Appellate Body Report on United States- Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from 
Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R (adopted November 28th 2005) paragraph 7.37, and Appellate Body Report on 
United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 
20
th
 2008) paragraph 161largely based on that DSU Article 17.13 establishes a hierarchy by providing that the 
Appellate Body may "uphold, modify or reverse" the legal findings and conclusions of panels 
27
 Appellate Body Report on Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R-WT/DS10/AB/R- 





Due to the size of this thesis all claims made in the dispute cannot be examined here. The goal 
of this thesis is to give an overview over the legal questions arising under the relevant 
provisions. At the time being it can be difficult to subsume facts to the questions posed, since 
the parties have not yet presented their evidence in this dispute. Despite the difficulties that 
may result from the lack of factual grounds, it will in this thesis be aimed after answering the 
posed legal questions as thoroughly and exhaustively as possible.  
The focus of this thesis will be on the provisions expressing core principles of the WTO 
agreements. Since many of the core principles and objectives are common for all three 
relevant agreements; this thesis will be divided by the core principles, and not by agreements. 
The following will be divided in to four main parts. In the first three parts it will be examined 
whether the seal regime is inconsistent with the principles of non-discrimination, of removing 
obstacles to trade and of removing quantitative restrictions to trade. Subsequently, the last part 




2. The principles of non-discrimination  
 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the cornerstones of the WTO. The idea is to 
hinder origin of products from influencing whether products are allowed into Member’s 
markets. The Appellate Body has expressed; “The essence of the non-discrimination 
obligations is that like products should be treated equally, irrespective of their origin”.
29
 The 
principle and its different sides are reflected in many provisions. The provisions that are 
relevant for this thesis are GATT 1994 Article I:1 and III:4, as well as TBT Agreement 
Article 2.1. 
GATT 1994 Article I:1 reflects the principle of “Most-Favoured-Nations Treatment” 
(hereinafter “MFN-treatment”). According to the Appellate Body “The purpose of Article I:1 
is to ensure unconditional MFN treatment” and to prevent discrimination amongst Members.
30
 
The idea is that WTO Members must accord the best-available treatment accorded to the most 
favoured nation, MFN-treatment, to all other Members.
31 
According to this provision;  
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in … any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in … all other contracting parties”.  
 
GATT 1994 Article III:4 reflects the principle of National Treatment. The purpose of the 
National Treatment obligation is to avoid protectionism towards national products, and 
Members must accord foreign products the same treatment as national products.
32
 According 
to the provision: 
                                                          
29
 Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted February 5
th
 1995) paragraph 189 
30
 Appellate Body Report on Canada- Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R 
(adopted June 19th 2000) paragraph 7.42 
31
 Andrew T Guzman and Joost H.B Pauwelyn page 287 
32
Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted March 12th 2001) paragraph 97 Further in Appellate Body Report on 
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 
(adopted February 5
th
 1995) paragraph 216 it was expressed that there however is no need for a consideration 
of whether the measure affords protectionism in determining breach of GATT 1994 Article III:4 
13 
 
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin”.  
 
TBT Agreement Article 2.1 both expresses obligation for non-discrimination between foreign 
products (MFN-treatment), and between foreign and national products (National Treatment). 
According to this provision: 
“Members shall ensure that … products imported from the territory of any Member 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin and to like products originating in any other country”. 
 
This provision is similar to both GATT Article I:1 and III:4. The TBT Agreement furthers the 
objective of GATT 1994 “through a specialized legal regime that applies solely to a limited 
class of measures. For these measures, the TBT Agreement imposes obligations on Members 




According to the Interpretive Note to Annex 1 WTO Agreement, in the case of a conflict 
between GATT 1994 and other agreements listed in Annex 1, the rules in the other 
agreements shall prevail in extent of the conflict. This and the above quoted indicates that the 
TBT Agreement is lex specialis on the area of technical regulations. A legal examination 
should therefore start out in the TBT Agreement. This is supported by several panel and 
Appellate Body reports which, based on the foregoing, found it appropriate to start their 
analysis by examining the claims under the TBT Agreement.
34 
 
                                                          
33
 Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted March 12th 2001) paragraph 80 
34
Panel Report on Panel Report on United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale 
of Tuna and Tuna products, WT/DS381/R (circulated December 15th 2011, appealed) paragraphs 7.38- 7.46,  
Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R paragraphs 8.16-8.17, Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Regime 
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R paragraph 204, Panel Report on Panel 
Report on United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/ DS384/R paragraphs 




2.1 The principle of non-discrimination in the TBT Agreement  
 
The EU is only obliged by the provision in the TBT Agreement if the seal regime falls under 
the scope of the TBT Agreement. The first question here is thereby whether the seal regime is 
a technical regulation.  
According TBT Agreement Annex 1 number 1, technical regulations covered by the 
agreement are “Document which lays down product characteristics or … production methods 
… with which compliance is mandatory.” 
In order to be considered a technical regulation the seal regime’s measures must lay down 
product characteristics and the compliance with the characteristics or production methods 
must be mandatory. In the prohibition of the seal regime the product characteristics is the 
product’s content. The characteristic of the exceptions is the reason for the hunt of the seal 
contained in the products. Only products containing seal fall under the seal regime, and only 
products fulfilling the exceptions are allowed into the EU market, thus compliance is 
mandatory. 
In the introductory passage of TBT Agreement Article 2 lies another criterion for a measure to 
be considered a technical regulation covered by the article. The measures must be prepared, 
adopted and regulated by Central Government Bodies as described in TBT Agreement Annex 
1 number 6. Both the basic regulation and the implementing regulation are prepared, adopted 
and regulated by Central Government Bodies within the EU, notably the European Parliament 
and the Commission, as described in Annex 1 number 6. 
The Appellate Body has in its interpretation of Annex 1 number I found that the measures 
must apply to an identifiable product or group of products for falling under the definition 
“technical regulation”.
35
 The seal regime applies to products derived from seal, which is an 
identifiable group of products.  
The seal regime’s measures are technical regulations.  
The seal regime is nominally origin neutral and does not separate between domestic and 
foreign products, or between foreign products. The non-discrimination obligation in TBT 
                                                          
35
 Panel Report on European Communities – Trade Description adopted Sardines, WT/DS231/R (adopted 
September 26
th
 2002) paragraph 176 
15 
 
Article 2.1 covers both MFN-treatment and National Treatment. Because of the here 
mentioned it is not necessary to separately examine whether the seal regime breaches the 
EU’s MFN-treatment obligation and National Treatment obligation. 
The following discussion will be divided into two separate parts. The first part will focus on 
“like products” and will be divided into three examinations. The first to be examined is 
whether the seal regime discriminates between seal products and other “like” non-seal 
containing products through the general prohibition. The two subsequent examinations will be 
of whether the seal regime discriminates between seal products through the Inuit-exception 
and through the sustainable management exception. In the second part it will be examined 
whether the seal regime accords treatment “no less favourable” to like products from all 
Members. 
 
2.1.1 a) The seal regime’s general prohibition  and “like products”  
 
The obligation of non-discrimination between like products does not only include the exact 
same products, but also products that must be considered to be “like”. In a legal examination 
it is customary to start in the letter of the law. A normal understanding of the wording “like 
products” is that the products share the same characteristics and are similar.
36
 
Earlier practice has in interpreting the wording “like” in the TBT Agreement Article 2.1 used 
the same elements as those carved out for GATT 1994 Article III:4.
37
 Regarding the wording 
in GATT 1994 Article III:4 the Appellate Body expressed the following:  
“As products that are in a competitive relationship in the marketplace could be 
affected through treatment of imports ‘less favourable’ than the treatment accorded to 
domestic products, it follows that the word ‘like’ in Article III:4 is to be interpreted to 
apply to products that are in such a competitive relationship.”
38
  
For finding products to be “like” after TBT Agreement Article 2.1 the Appellate Body has set 
out four criteria: 
                                                          
36
 Catherin Soanes and Angus Stevenson, Concise Oxford English Dictionary Luxury Edition, Oxford 2008 p. 825 
37
 Panel Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/R 
(circulated to WTO members April 4th 2012) paragraph 7.121 and following on TBT Agreement Article 2.1  
38
 Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted March 12th 2001) paragraph 99 
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“(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; 
(iii) consumers’ tastes and habits … in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff 
classification of the products.”
39
  
The seal’s meat, fur, fat and other components are used in many different products.
40
 
According to the preamble in the basic regulation on seal products “it is difficult or 
impossible for consumers to distinguish them from similar products not derived from seals” 
because of “the nature of those products”. This suggests that there are competitive products 
with the same properties, nature and quality, intended for the same end-use as seal products.  
Whether the third criterion is fulfilled is more uncertain since the EU partially justified the 
seal regime by a demand from the EU citizens.
41
 If the citizens prefer non-seal-containing 
products the criteria might not be fulfilled.
42
  
In earlier case law it has been expressed that measures’ underlying considerations and 
concerns could be relevant in determining the likeness of products. In US-Clove the panel 
expressed the following: 
“we are not suggesting that the regulatory concerns underlying technical regulations 
may not play a role in the determination of whether or not products are like. In this 
respect, we recall that, in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body found that regulatory 
concerns and considerations may play a role in applying certain of the "likeness" 
criteria (that is, physical characteristics and consumer preferences) and, thus, in the 
determination of likeness”.
43 
This suggests that the objectives of the seal regime, notably the protection of seal welfare 
could lead to finding seal products to differ, in regards to consumer preferences, from those 
who do not contain seal. However, in Tuna-Dolphin the Panel found that tuna not labeled 
“dolphin-safe tuna”, was “like” “dolphin-safe tuna” despite of the latter being preferred by the 
                                                          
39
 Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes 
WT/DS406/AB/R paragraph 120 and Panel Report on United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna products, WT/DS381/R paragraphs 7.235 and 7.240. 
40
 The EU’s list of products that may include seal product is long, see http address in references 
41
 Preamble of the basic regulation 
42
 It will be the parties challenging this Article (Norway and Canada) to prove that the criterion is fulfilled, and in 
absence of evidence on this third criterion one must conclude that there are differences in consumer’s tastes 
and habits. Simon Baughen page 25 
43




citizens of the United States, and despite that the labeling requirement was imposed for the 
protection of dolphin life.
44
  
The differences between product categories, such as that some contain seal, are relevant in 
determining competitiveness of the product categories, but are not sufficient to establish that 
competitive products are not like.
45
 This suggest that if the EU consumers’ preferences is the 
only thing to differ seal products from products not containing seal, their preferences is not 
sufficient to establish that non-containing seal products are not like. 
It will not be looked into certain products which could be “like”, and it is therefore not 
possible to look at unknown product’s tariff classification.
46
 
It will be for the claimants to prove that there are other like products not falling under the 
prohibition in the seal regime. In the following it will be presumed that there are “other like 
products”. 
 
2.1.1 b) The Inuit-exception and “like products” 
 
As mentioned above, products are like when they are in a competitive relationship and four 
criteria are fulfilled: “(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of 
the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits … in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff 
classification of the products.”
47
 
The Inuit-exception is explained by the fact that some indigenous communities depend on the 
commercial export of seal products.
48
 It is not the products themselves that differs from other 
seal products, but the difference lies in who have hunted and produced the products. The 
difference does not lie in the end-uses of the products, and likely neither in the tariff 
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classification. The question is if these products differ in nature and if consumers’ tastes and 
habits are different for these products than other seal products.  
Based on the reasoning of the seal regime’s objective of protecting citizen’s moral belief, one 
could imagine consumer’s tastes and habits to be different for products derived from seal 
hunted and skinned in a manner the consumers were not opposed to. However this is not the 
case for products deriving from seal hunt falling under the Inuit-exception. As the consumers 
are opposed to the methods of hunting and skinning seals, it is presumable that they do not 
find the hunt more morally acceptable because the hunters are indigenous. The conclusion 
will be that consumer’s tastes and habits do not make seal products falling under the Inuit-
exception different from those not falling under the exception. 
The next question that can be posed is whether the products deriving from indigenous people 
differ in nature from other seal products. According to a dictionary interpretation of the word 
“nature”; it regards “the basic or inherent features… or character of a … thing”.
49
 The Inuit-
exception products themselves do not differ in nature from other seal products.  
As mentioned the seal regime’s underlying considerations and concerns could be relevant in 
determining the likeness of products. The underlying reasoning for the Inuit-exception was 
the protection of the traditional way of life of indigenous groups. 
The parties are bound by international law to protect and respect the traditional way of life of 
indigenous groups.
50
 In interpreting the TBT Agreement the interpreter is to take into account 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable to the relationship between the parties”.
51
 If 
the EU is obliged to protect indigenous people’s seal hunt, the question is whether such other 
treaty obligations will make the Inuit-exception products different so that the exception is 
allowed within WTO.
52 
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When interpreting treaties one shall interpret them so that they do not come in conflict with 
the essence of other treaties.
53
 This means that the panel might have to examine whether there 
is a way to preserve the essence of both ILO 169 and the TBT Agreement.  
The essence of treaties on indigenous people’s rights is to protect and respect the traditional 
way of life of indigenous groups. The Inuit-exception seeks to preserve the traditional seal 
hunt and safeguard indigenous people’s livelihood. The essence of the TBT Agreements, in 
furthering the objectives of GATT 1994, is to liberalize trade through, among other measures, 
prevent discrimination between trading partners.
54
 Within the TBT Agreement there are 
certain safeguards preventing unwanted results from the imposed obligations. Preserving 
traditional hunting or production methods is not a legitimate reason to allow discrimination 
within the TBT or other WTO agreements. Nor is non-developing countries’ or people’s 
dependence on the export of a certain product.  
Because protecting indigenous people’s traditions and subsistence is not a legitimate objective 
for discrimination within the TBT Agreement or within WTO system, the difference that may 
lay in the nature of seal products from the Intuit, cannot be accepted as a difference capable of 
allowing discrimination between countries. This is because the TBT Agreement allows certain 
policy objectives, in so far as they do not discriminate between countries.
55 
For this thesis seal products allowed into the EU market based on the Inuit-exception will be 
regarded as like to other seal products that do not origin from indigenous groups falling under 
the exception. 
 
2.1.1 c) The sustainable management exception and “like products” 
 
The difference between products allowed under this exception and those falling under the 
general prohibition, does not lie within the products themselves, nor in who have hunted the 
products and how, but in why the seal have been hunted.  
The question will then be whether there are underlying considerations and concerns that could 
be relevant in determining the likeness of products. 
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Within the WTO the sustainable management of natural resources is a legitimate objective 
able to trump WTO obligations. It is therefore plausible that the panel could find products 
hunted in accordance with sustainable management to differ in certain of the likeness criteria, 
from those hunted contrary to sustainable management. However, the amount of seal hunted 
in Canada and Norway are based on quotas for a sustainable management of ocean resources 
set in accordance with recommendations from the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea.
56
 This should indicate that all seal products are hunted in accordance with sustainable 
management, and that the seal products allowed under the sustainable management exception 
is not different from other seal products.  
That these products are hunted without a view to economical gain is the next difference that 
may lead to finding these products to differ from other seal products. In interpreting treaties 
one cannot interpret the provisions so as the treaty loses its essence. To prevent economical 
gain from products is contrary to both the WTO Agreement and the TBT Agreement as these 
seek to enhance economical gain through enhanced freer trade. This indicated that the panel 
will not find this difference to make the seal products falling under the sustainable 
management regarded as not like within the meaning of TBT Article 2.2.  
The sustainable management seal products are like those not falling under the exception.  
 
2.1.2 “no less favourable treatment” 
 
For finding a breach of TBT Agreement Article 2.1 seal products have to be found to be 
accorded “less favourable treatment” than like products. A previous panel report found that 
“less favourable treatment would arise …if imported products originating in any Member 




The first question is whether the general prohibition places seal products at a disadvantage, 
according them less favourable treatment. Seal products are prohibited from being imported 
into the EU and marketed in the EU, whilst the like products are not subject to the prohibition 
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are allowed imported and marketed. This means those seal products prohibited are placed at a 
disadvantage compared to like products, and thus that seal products falling under the 
prohibition are accorded “less favourable treatment”. 
 
The second question is whether the exceptions accords less favourable treatment to seal 
products not falling under the exceptions. Seal products falling under the exception are 
allowed imported and marketed in the EU, whilst those not falling under the exception are 
not. This suggests that seal products not falling under the exception are placed at a 
disadvantage compared to like products, and thus they are accorded “less favourable 
treatment”.  
However, for finding a breach of the non-discrimination obligation, it must be proven that 
products from certain Members are accorded less favourable treatment.
58
 The questions are 
thereby whether seal products from certain Members are placed at a disadvantage or whether 
products imported from certain Members, outside or within the EU, are accorded more 
favourable treatment.  
Within the Inuit-exception lies the seal regime’s only origin criterion. Only products from 
countries with indigenous populations that fulfill the criteria listed in the implementing 
regulation Article 3 can be imported as commercial products. Because of the vastness of 
criteria for products to fall under the Inuit-exception, it is possible that Norway will claim that 
seal products from indigenous communities other than the Inuit community on Greenland, do 
not fall under the exception. If Norway can prove that the Inuit-exception does discriminate 
between indigenous people from different countries, the Inuit-exception will be inconsistent 
with EU’s obligations of MFN-treatment since countries with a vast Inuit population then 
would be granted an advantage and thus more favourable treatment. It is outside the extent of 
this thesis to investigate such a claim, and here it will be presumed that the Inuit-exception 
accords the same “favourabe treatment” and “advantage” irrespective of origin. 
The sustainable management exception is, de jure, origin neutral, and so is the general 
prohibition. However, a breach of TBT Article 2.1 could be found if seal products de facto are 
accorded less favourable treatment than products originating in certain countries.
59
 To find 
whether seal products are accorded “less favourable” treatment than like products from 
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certain Members, one must know whether like products not falling under the seal regime 
originate in certain countries. As it will not be looked into certain like products, it is not 
possible to answer this question here. For this thesis it will be presumed that the general 
prohibition and the sustainable management exception accord the same treatment to all 
Members.  
The seal regime is consistent with EU’s obligations under TBT Agreement Article 2.1 
 
2.2 The principle of non-discrimination in GATT 1994 
 
The first examination to undertake is whether the seal regime falls under the scope of GATT 
1994 Article I:1 and III:4.  
GATT 1994 Article I:1 covers rules, formalities and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation. The seal regime consists of rules imposed on importation of seal 
products. GATT 1994 Article III:4 covers laws, regulations and requirements affecting the 
sale, purchase, distribution or use of seal products. The seal regime consists of laws, 
requirements and regulations affecting the marketing and thus the sale, purchase and 
distribution of seal products within the EU. The seal regime falls under the scope of both 
provisions. 
According to case law there are three main questions in an examination of whether the MFN-
treatment obligation in GATT Article I:1  has been breached; whether there is granted 
advantages covered by the article, whether the advantage has been accorded (i) to like 
products (ii) “immediately and unconditionally”.
60 
As above seen, the seal products falling under the prohibition, in general or because they do 
not fall under the exceptions, have been placed at a disadvantage. This harmonizes with the 
wording “advantage” in GATT 1994 Article I:1.
61
 The products not falling under the 
prohibition are granted an advantage of access to the EU market.  
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However, for finding a breach of the MFN-treatment obligation, certain members must be 
accorded more favourable treatment than others. According to the provision an advantage 
must be granted to products “originating … in any country” to be covered by the provision. 
This advantage can be accorded either de jure or de facto.
62
 For the same reasons as under the 
discussion on TBT Agreement Article 2.1, the lack of factual ground has the consequence that 
it is not possible to conclude on whether the seal regime grants advantages to products from 
certain countries. It is thus not possible to know whether the seal regime accords such 
advantages as covered by the provision. 
If the panel finds the advantage to be covered by the provision, the subsequent question is 
whether the advantage has been accorded to “like products”.  
The wording “like” is interpreted in the same way for GATT Article I:1 as for TBT Article 
2.1 and the above quoted criteria derived from GATT Article III:4. This means that the 
findings of “like products” can be transferred to the analysis of GATT 1994 Article I:1. 
Above it was presumed that there are “like” products not falling under the prohibition. The 
advantage of not being prohibited from importation and marketing has not been accorded to 
“like products” falling under the prohibition, in breach of GATT 1994 Article I:1. 
Since the advantage is not granted to all like products, the advantage is thus not accorded 
immediately or unconditionally.
63 
For GATT 1994 Article III:4, based on the similarities of the wording  in TBT Agreement 
Article 2.1 the considerations are the same ones under both provisions, notably whether the 
seal regime discriminates between “like products” by not according “no less favourable 
treatment” to products of all origin.  
In interpreting treaties the interpreter shall look at the context of the provision and the treaty, 
including other agreements made in connection of the conclusion of the treaty.
64
 Both the 
TBT Agreement and GATT 1994 were made in the connection of the conclusion of the WTO 
Agreement, and are thus in the context of one another, meaning that one is relevant for 
interpreting the other. In case law the considerations under TBT Agreement Article 2.1 has 
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been found to be the same as under GATT 1994 Article III:4.
65
 The discussion under the TBT 
Agreement Article 2.1 was largely influenced by practice referring to the considerations under 
GATT 1994 Article III:4, and the elements there listed were originally set for an examination 
of GATT 1994 Article III:4.
66
 For GATT 1994 Article III:4 there is therefore no need for a 
separate  examination here.  
When transferring the questions and findings from the TBT Article 2.1 analysis, the findings 
for GATT 1994 Article III:4 will be that there are other products not falling under the 
prohibition, like those falling under the prohibition. Furthermore that it is presumed that the 
seal products not falling under the exceptions are like those falling under the exception. 
Neither for GATT 1994 Article III:4  can it be proven that the seal regime discriminates 
between like products of different origin, and no breach of the provision can thus be found. 
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3. The objective of eliminating obstacles to trade 
 
The objective of eliminating obstacles to international trade is one of the core objectives of 
the WTO. All agreements within the WTO share this objective, and most of the articles reflect 
the aim of liberalizing and eliminating obstacles to international trade. According to the 
preamble of the TBT Agreement the signatories desired “to ensure that technical regulations 
...  do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade". For this dispute, a relevant article directly 
reflecting this principle is TBT Agreement Article 2.2. 
According to the provision:  
“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.”   
The question under this provision is whether the seal regime is an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade in seal products. 
 
3.1 Unnecessary obstacle to trade 
 
According to a dictionary interpretation “obstacle” is a blockade or a hindrance for progress.
67
 
The seal regime is an obstacle as it blocks trade of commercial seal products between EU and 
other WTO members. According to the preamble of the implementing regulation, the 
objective of the seal regime was sought reached through creating obstacles to international 
trade. The seal regime is hindering the progress of reaching the WTO objectives. The question 
is whether the seal regime, as an obstacle to international trade, is “unnecessary”.  
TBT Agreement Article 2.2 prescribes what will be considered to be an unnecessary obstacle. 
In its second part one can read that for the purpose of not creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade: 
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“technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such 
legitimate objectives are inter alia,… animal … life or health ...”.  
Reading the two quoted parts together, an obstacle to trade is unnecessary when it is not 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, or if the technical regulation is more restrictive than 
necessary to achieve a legitimate objective.
68
 
The first examination to undertake is whether the seal regime is trade-restrictive. This is the 
first question because the seal regime must be found to be trade-restrictive for there to be a 
reason to examine whether the trade-restrictiveness is justified through a legitimate objective. 
For finding the seal regime to be trade-restrictive it is sufficient to find the measures to 
impose limits on imports.
69
 The seal regime restricts trade in seal products. It is certain that 
the seal regime is trade-restrictive. 
In the following it will first be examined whether the sought objective is legitimate as 
prescribed by TBT Agreement Article 2.2, and if so whether the seal regime fulfills the 
legitimate objective. If the answers are affirmative, subsequently it will be examined whether 
the seal regime is more trade-restrictive than necessary for achieving the objective of 
protecting animal life and health. Under the latter examination it will be looked at 
alternatives, taken into account the risk non-conformity would create.  
 
3.1.1 Legitimate objective  
 
In this part it will be examined whether the objectives are legitimate. In doing so the wording 
“legitimate” must be interpreted.
70
 In US-COOL the panel used a dictionary interpretation and 
expressed that a measure will be “legitimate” when the objective is “"conformable to law or 
principle" or "justifiable and proper".
71 
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Protecting seal life and health falls directly within the wording of the article as a legitimate 
objective. The provision provides a non-exhaustive list for legitimate objectives.
72
 For the 
objective of protecting seal welfare, one should find the objective to be conformable to law 
and principles on animal welfare, and that it is justifiable and proper. That the objective of 
protecting seal welfare is legitimate, is further supported by the wording “animal health”, 
since “health” today can be interpreted as including welfare. 
The objective of diminishing the economical demand leading to commercial seal hunt does 
not fall under the wording, and it is not similar to the directly mentioned objectives. In the last 
Panel Report on Tuna-Dolphin it was found that protecting dolphin life or health by ensuring 
that consumers’ behavior does not encourage fishing methods that effect dolphins, was 
legitimate.
73
 For the EU this can mean that protecting seal life or health by diminishing seal 
hunt through ensuring that consumers cannot buy seal products, and thereby not encourage 
commercial seal hunt, can be considered a legitimate objective. 
For the EU, another objective is preventing consumers’ uncertainty as to whether the products 
contain seal. In US-COOL the panel used another WTO Agreement, the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (hereinafter GATS), for interpreting whether consumer information is 
legitimate objective under TBT Agreement Article 2.2. In GATS Article VI:4, a provision 
similar to TBT Agreement Article 2.2, consumer information is mentioned as a legitimate 
objective. The panel found this to mean that consumer information could be a legitimate 
objective also under TBT Agreement Article 2.2. They further expressed that “Social norms 
must be accorded due weight in considering whether a particular objective pursued by a 
government can be considered legitimate”.
74
  
It is known that the citizens of the EU want to know whether products contain seal and that 
buying seal products is against social norms. The difference lies in that the seal regime 
prohibits import, and does not as the United States in US-COOL, require information through 
labeling. This may lead to it being harder to find the seal regime as pursuing a legitimate 
objective in this dispute.  
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The consumer information for the seal regime is a consequence of protecting citizen’s moral. 
In China-Audiovisuals the panel expressed that "the protection of public morals ranks among 
the most important values or interests pursued by Members".
75
 This quote, read together with 
the extracts from the last Tuna-Dolphin, leads to finding the objective of protecting public 
moral through consumer information, a legitimate objective covered by TBT Article 2.2 
The seal regime’s objectives are legitimate under TBT Agreement Article 2.2.  
 
3.1.2 The fulfilling of the objective  
 
The question now becomes whether the seal regime fulfills its legitimate objectives. The term 
“fulfil” can be defined as providing fully what is wished for. The Panel in US-COOL used this 
interpretation and expressed a need for the measure at issue to carry out and perform the 
objective.
76
 For finding the measure to fulfill the objective, they further expressed that there 




First it can be stated for the objective of consumer information, that the seal regime does not 
fulfill the legitimate objective. This is because seal products still are allowed imported and 
marketed within the EU, without other labeling requirements than those present prior to the 
seal regime.  
Next, for the objective of protection of seal life it will be looked into whether the seal regime 
provides protection. The seal regime has made seal hunting less advantageous, and the 
amount of seals hunted may have decreased due to the seal regime.
78
 However, as above 
mentioned, the number of seals allowed hunted in Canada and Norway, is based on quotas. 
The quotas reflect the amount of seal necessary to be taken out for a sustainable management 
of the ocean resources. The amount of seal hunted might not decrease in the future as 
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countries with seal populations will have to regulate the seal populations for a sustainable 
management of their marine resources, regardless of whether there is a demand for the 
products. It is uncertain how the panel will weigh the mentioned elements, and whether they 
rather would examine the actual decrease in the amount of seals hunted. 
The next legitimate objective to be examined whether it is fulfilled by the seal regime, is the 
protection of animal welfare. Seal welfare was the main reasoning of the seal regime. Seal 
hunt is by some regarded as brutal and inhumane, and the citizens’ main concerns were the 
seal’s pain and distress caused by the hunting methods. The EU citizens were opposed to the 
skinning of live seals. Since the protection of public moral is directly linked to seal welfare, 
the protection of public moral will not be fulfilled if the protection of seal welfare is not 
fulfilled. 
Seal hunting has developed during the last century and there might not be reason for the 
concerns. Regulations with regard to quotas, a limited hunting season, protection of certain 
animals as well as restriction on hunting methods, have been placed on the industry in all the 
participating countries.  
The reality is that today’s modern seal hunt is deeply regulated for animal welfare purposes. 
Examples on the strict regulation can be that Norwegian hunters are obliged to use certain 
firearms, ammunition and must pass tests with the authorized weapons and ammunitions 
before each season. They also have to carry a hakapik to club the head of the already shot seal 
to make sure it is dead.
79
 Only adult seals are allowed hunted. It is forbidden to skin seals 
alive, and the regulations on how to drain and skin the animal are very detailed.
80
 Furthermore 
a veterinarian must be onboard at all times to make sure animal welfare rules are applied. The 
Canadian Law is not as detailed, however the essence of the obligations to treat seals 
humanely is the same.
81 
By comparing EU and Norwegian legislation on animal welfare, and Norwegian, Canadian 
and EU rules of slaughtering and treatment of seals, one finds that the principles are the same 
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 Both the seal regime’s and the claimant’s legislation on seal hunt are lex specialis to 
protect seal welfare. This suggests that the seal regime does not fulfill the objective. 
There has not been found to be a genuine relationship between the seal regime and the factual 
protection of seal life or welfare. Even though the seal regime has cut off one of the biggest 
markets for seal products, this does not mean that the amount of seal hunted will diminish. 
Nor does it imply that the hunting methods will change.  
Even though the factors looked at imply that the seal regime does not fulfill the objective, the 
limited facts, together with the burden of proof, leads to uncertainty. It will not be concluded 
on whether the seal regime fulfills the objective; rather it will be looked into the second 
criteria for finding the seal regime not to be an unnecessary obstacle to trade. 
 
3.2 More trade restrictive than necessary 
 
The question now is whether the seal regime is more trade-restrictive than necessary for 
achieving the objective of protecting seal life and health. The preamble of the implementing 
regulation states that the objective of the seal regime is protection of seal life and health, and 
that the seal regime is necessary to fulfill this objective. The preamble also expresses that the 
mechanism verifying compliance with the requirements of the seal regime, “should not be 
more trade-restrictive than necessary”. The wording of the preamble does not, however, lead 
to finding the seal regime not to be more trade-restrictive than necessary.  
For finding a measure to be necessary there should not be alternatives, since alternative 
measures imply that the existing measure can be replaced and thereby not “necessary”. For 
finding the seal regime not to be more trade restrictive than necessary, there should not be less 
trade-restrictive alternatives. This is supported by the US-COOL dispute where the panel 
expressed that whether a measure is more trade restrictive than necessary, is based on the 
availability of less trade-restrictive alternatives.
 83
 To be considered as a reasonable available 
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alternative, the panel further found that the alternatives must equally fulfill the objective 
pursed. 
 
3.2.1 Less trade-restrictive alternatives 
 
It will now be examined whether there are less trade-restrictive alternatives which equally 
fulfill the objective pursued.  
In the preamble of the basic regulation other options are mentioned. One option mentioned is 
labeling. The EU has found labeling not to reach the same result, to be disproportionately 
expensive and to impose a significant burden on manufacturers, distributors and retailers.
84
  
Labeling products could be WTO-consistent and are less trade-restrictive as they do not 
impose a ban. The products that could have been labeled are those containing seal. Labeling 
requirements are normal, and there is thus a presumption for considering labeling not to be 
burdensome. Requiring labeling of products should not be more burdensome than implying 
the requirements of the current seal regime. The conformity assessment procedures would not 
be disproportionally expensive for the EU as it generally is the exporters who bear the costs.  
To be a reasonable alternative, labeling must fulfill the objective equivalent to the seal 
regime. The EU Parliament Rapporteur Diana Wallis concluded in her report that “the 
labelling of products is the best way to help ensure high animal welfare standards”. Labeling 
would also protect citizen’s moral as they by labeling will know whether products contain 
seal. 
The EU is not imposed to seal hunting in general, but to the way it is done. Based on this, 
another alternative would have been to allow into the EU market those seal products which 
have been hunted in an, for the EU, acceptable manner. In a proposal for regulation on trade 
in seal products, the commission proposed a ban with exceptions similar to the alternative 
here mentioned.
85
 The regulation was not adopted with the proposed exception, and this 
alternative exception was dismissed in the preamble of the basic regulation. The EU argues 
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that “a verification and control of hunters’ compliance with animal welfare requirements is 
not feasible in practice or, at least, is very difficult to achieve in an effective way”.
86
 
The EU has no authority to investigate foreign hunters’ compliance with EU animal welfare 
requirements.
87
 However an alternative is to examine the national law of the countries 
exporting seal products into the EU, and whether their laws comply with EU’s requirements. 
If they do, the EU should trust that the exporting countries control and verify their hunters’ 
compliance with laws. This solution requires less of the EU than the existing seal regime 
since the hunters are obliged to follow these laws, irrespectively of the seal regime.  
The options must provide an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective 
pursued in order to be reasonable available. When seal is hunted in a way that fulfills animal 
welfare requirements, the objective of protecting seal welfare is achieved. This alternative 
could lead to hunters seeking to use methods accepted by the EU, and thereby contribute to 
enhanced seal welfare. 
According to the letter of the law, it must be taken into account the risk non-fulfillment would 
create. In this analysis a previous panel found that it must be looked into the gravity of 
potential risks to arise in the event that the legitimate objective was not fulfilled.
88
 The 
alternatives here looked at would protect animal life and welfare and thus also protect public 
moral, equivalently to the current measures in the seal regime. The alternatives mentioned 
would not entail grave potential risks of non-fulfilment of the EU’s objectives.  
As there are other less trade-restrictive alternatives, the seal regime is more trade-restrictive 
than necessary. 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
The seal regime is an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.  
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Due to the preamble of the TBT Agreement it can be asked whether there are exceptions from 
EU’s obligation.
89
 The preamble indicates that exceptions similar to the ones in GATT 1994 
Article XX can be invoked
 
 under the same conditions as for GATT Article XX.
90
 Because of 
this, it has been a question in earlier practice whether exceptions in GATT Article XX can be 
invoked for TBT Agreement obligations. In the last Appellate Body report the question was 
answered, implicitly, but negatively for Article 2.1. The reasoning was the fact that the 
balance between the interest of compliance with the agreement and the Member’s right to 
regulate on policy objectives, are to be found within the provision itself, read together with 
the preamble.
91
 The balance laid out in Article 2.1 in the wording “not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective” is to be applied to Article 2.2.  
By comparing the preamble’s second and sixth recital with GATT Article XX, it is certain 
that the panel, regardless of their findings on the question, will not find the preamble to allow 
regulation for a wider range of policy objectives than after GATT Article XX. Because of this 
it will be presumed that the EU cannot invoke other policy objectives than under GATT 
Article XX for nullifying their obligations under TBT Agreement Article 2.2, and it will 
therefore only be examined whether the EU can invoke GATT 1994 Article XX. If the answer 
to this question is affirmative, it should be examined whether this implies that such objectives 
also should nullify the EU’s obligations under TBT Agreement Article 2.2 
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4. The prohibition on quantitative restrictions 
 
One of the cornerstones of the earlier GATT system is the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions.
92
  Quantitative restriction is a non-tariff barrier and the principle reflects that 
tariffs are preferred before quotas or other non-tariff restrictions in the WTO system.
93
 This is 
because tariffs allow import from the most-efficient competitor, while quantitative restrictions 
have a trade distorting effect by only allowing importation of a certain quantum. Furthermore 
the allocation of quotas can be problematic for the non-discrimination objectives of the 
WTO.
94 
The objective of prohibiting quantitative restrictions is today found in GATT 1994 Article 
XI:1 and in Agriculture Agreement Article 4.
95
 In a previous case the panel established that a 
violation of GATT 1994 Article XI would be a violation of the Agriculture Agreement Article 
4.2.
96
 Based on this report it is possible to base a discussion on the prohibition on quantitative 
restriction, solely on GATT 1994 Article XI:1.
97
 In the following the question will be if the 
seal regime is in breach of this provision.  
 
GATT 1194 Article XI:1 obliges that: 
“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party”. 
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The seal regime is “prohibitions … other than duties, taxes or other charges”. The seal regime 
is part a quantitative restriction as it allows importation of the quantum “zero” commercial 
seal products (not falling under the Inuit-exception) into the EU market.
98
 The seal regime 
imposes restriction made effective through import licences.   
In a similar case, the panel found that it was contrary to Article XI:1 that a Member banned 
imports of “products from any country not meeting certain policy conditions.”
99
 In our case 
EU bans imports of seal products not falling under the exceptions of the seal regime.  
 
4.1 Conclusion on the prohibition on quantitative restrictions  
 
The seal regime is inconsistent with the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in GATT 
Article XI:1 and thereby inconsistent with Agriculture Agreement Article 4.2. There are 
however several exceptions to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions. Some exceptions 
are set out in GATT Article XI:2. Neither of these exceptions are applicable in our case.
100
 
Furthermore the general exception rule in GATT 1994 Article XX applies to GATT Article 
XI:1. This means that one must examine whether the seal regime falls under this provision 
before making a final conclusion on whether the seal regime is contrary to the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions.   
For Agriculture Agreement Article 4.2 there are no explicit exceptions, but in practice it has 
been discussed whether the exception in GATT Article XX in a specific case can cover other 
WTO Agreements such as the Agriculture Agreement.
101
 This means that one must examine 
whether the seal regime falls under one of the exceptions in GATT 1994 Article XX before a 
final conclusion can be reached on whether the seal regime is contrary to the prohibition on 
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quantitative restrictions. If answered affirmative, it should be examined whether these 
exceptions are applicable for the Agricultural Agreement in this case. 
37 
 
5. Exceptions to WTO obligations in GATT 1994 Article XX 
 
The General Exception rule found in GATT 1994 Article XX is applicable to all GATT 1994 
provisions, and as above seen, maybe also to provisions of the TBT Agreement and the 
Agricultural Agreement. GATT 1994 Article XX allows some important non-economic 
objectives, under certain conditions, to trump WTO obligations to liberalize trade.
102
 This 
means that the seal regime’s measures which are in breach of the EU’s obligations under the 
mentioned GATT articles might be justified under GATT 1994 Article XX. 
The article is build up by a general opening clause (often referred to as “the chapeau”) and by 
particular exceptions divided in subparagraphs (a)-(j). The subparagraphs that could be 
relevant in this case are (a) and (b).
103
  
When applying article XX one must examine whether the regulations fall within one of the 
exceptions in Article XX and if this is answered affirmative, examine whether the regulations 
comply with the opening clause.
104
 One of the reasons for this is that the chapeau has been 
“worded so to prevent the abuse of the exceptions in Article XX”.
105
 In the following it will 
be examined whether the seal regime falls within subparagraph (a) and subsequently whether 




5.1 GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (a) 
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This exception applies to measures that are “necessary to protect public morals”. The wording 
implies a twofold analysis; whether the seal regime protects public morals and whether the 
seal regime is necessary for accomplishing this objective. 
 
5.1.1 Protection of public morals    
 
The exception in GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (a) has only been tried in one dispute; 
China-Audiovisuals.
107
 In this dispute the panel referred to the interpretation of the wording 
“necessary to protect public morals” in another case regarding an almost identical article in 




Against using such jurisprudence speaks the fact that it here is dealt with two different articles 
in two different agreements. In interpreting treaties one “should not automatically transpose 
jurisprudence developed in the context of one provision to another. Rather, a treaty interpreter 
must carefully consider any differences in the wording, context and purpose of different 
provisions, and assess the significance of any such differences”.
109
  
However, the Appellate Body has previously found that jurisprudence under the GATT 1994 
Article XX could be relevant for the interpretation of analogous provisions in GATS Article 
XIV. GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (a) is analogous to GATS Article XIV (a).
110
 
Jurisprudence under GATS Article XIV (a) is thus relevant for interpretation of the wording 
“public morals” in GATT Article XX (a).
111 
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In US-Gambling the panel used the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to interpret the term 
“public” and “moral”. They found the wording “public moral” to denote to “standards of right 
and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation”, here the EU.
112
 
This interpretation is the same for GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (a).
113 
According to case law, the EU “should be given some scope to define and apply for 
themselves the concept of “public moral”” within the union “according to their own systems 
and scales of values”
114
 The EU explains the seal regime in part by the citizen’s demand for 
measures prohibiting import and trade of seal products. The citizens find the hunting of seal to 
be unmoral. One might therefore say that the seal regime is aimed at protecting the public 
moral as standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by EU citizens. 
The question is now whether the seal regime is necessary the protection of public moral.  
 
5.1.2 “Necessary for the protection of public moral” 
 
Synonyms to the wording “necessary” are essential, indispensable, crucial and obligatory. 
According to the Appellate Body the wording could be reflecting degrees of necessity, and 




According to a previous panel report there should be a case by case weighing and balancing 
of a series of factors when examining the necessity of a measure. These factors include the 
contribution of the seal regime to the objective pursued, the importance of the common 
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If one find the seal regime to be “necessary” for achieving a certain objective; the “result must 
be confirmed by comparing the measure with its possible reasonable available 
alternatives”.
117 
This means that when examining whether the seal regime is necessary to achieve the 
objectives in the relevant subparagraphs of GATT Article XX there are four different 
examinations to undertake; first the relationship between the contribution of seal regime and 
the stated objective sought reached, second the importance of the values and interest protected 
by the seal regime, third the impact on those seeking to import seal products into the EU, and 
fourth if WTO-consistent alternatives are reasonable available.
118
 These four factors will be 
divided into four subtitles. 
 
5.1.2. a) The contribution of the seal regime for the protection of public moral 
 
For the contribution factor the Appellate Body has previously noted that the party invoking 
the exception, here the EU, should demonstrate that measure is necessary by evidence 
establishing that the measure contributes to achieving the objectives.
119
 The evidence does not 




As we saw above the seal regime is aimed at protecting public moral. This does not however 
mean that the seal regime in fact contributes to the protection of public moral. On one side 
one can argue that there are other animals treated inhumanly and that the seal regime therefore 
does not contribute to the objective of protecting public morals concerning animal welfare in 
general. One could also argue that others do not find seal hunting unmoral, and one can say 
that seal hunt in fact is not inhumane. However the citizens of the EU made a demand 
specifically regarding trade in seal products, and not in other animal products.  There is 
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presumption for that the seal regime is suitable for the protection of public moral since this is 
one of the reasons for the seal regime.  
 
5.1.2 b) The importance of the values and interest sought protected  
 
In China-Audiovisuals the panel found that "the protection of public morals ranks among the 
most important values or interests pursued by Members".
121
 This should mean that the relative 
importance of the protection of public morals is high. When the importance of the protection 
is high, it should be easier to find the seal regime to fall within the exception in GATT 1994 
subparagraph (a). This is supported by EC-Asbestos where it was expressed that the more vital 
or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it is to accept as necessary 
measures designed to achieve those ends.
122 
 
5.1.2. c) The impact of the seal regime 
 
Before the entry into force of the seal regime, the EU was one of the biggest markets for seal 
products.
123
 This means that there is a presumption that seal regime has a big impact on seal 
product exporters.  
The exceptions in the seal regime are narrow, and few exporters fall under the exceptions. The 
only exporters who are allowed to gain on exporting seal products are the once falling under 
the Inuit-exception. The sustainable management exceptions prohibit exporting nations to 
gain on a sustainable management of their marine eco-system. As earlier mentioned, seal is 
hunted according to quotas set for the sustainable management of marine resources. Countries 
still need to manage their amount of seal in the future, and the seal regime’s impact on those 
countries will be that they will have to subsidies a bigger part of their seal hunting vessels and 
that they will lose income from taxation.  
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The seal regime has and will continue to have a big impact for the seal hunters, those seeking 
to import and export seal products and the countries where they reside. 
 
5.1.2 d) Alternative measures 
 
The consideration here is whether WTO-consistent less trade-restrictive alternatives are 
reasonable available. For being reasonable available the alternatives must provide an 
equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued and not be too 
burdensome compared to the existing measures.
124 
Above under the examination of TBT Agreement Article 2.2 it was found to be reasonable 
available alternatives to the seal regime. The question under this subparagraph is whether the 
alternatives provide an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective of 
protecting public moral. 
When the protection of public moral was based in a demand for seal welfare, the objective of 
protecting public moral is achieved when seals are hunted in a way that fulfills animal welfare 
requirements. It can be repeated here that if the EU opens up for importation of products that 
fulfill the animal welfare requirements; more producers of seal products would be likely to 
follow the requirements, and the objective would then be better reached than by existing the 
seal regime. The alternatives equally contribute to the protection of public moral. 
 
5.1.2 e) Conclusion  
 
To conclude one must consider the weight and balance the three first above mentioned 
elements. It has been shown that the importance of the protection of the public moral is to be 
applied much weight, and that the EU’s regulation contributes to protect the public moral. 
However it has been shown that the seal regime has a big impact on trade in seal products. 
Further the solution legislated by the EU is not the only reasonable available alternative for 
protecting public moral. As one need the fourth consideration to confirm that the seal regime 
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is necessary for protecting public moral, the seal regime does not fall under the exception 
“necessary to protect public morals”.  
 
 5.2 GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (b) 
 
This exception applies to measures which are “necessary to protect … animal … life or 
health”. The same twofold examination must be done here, notably whether the seal regime 
protects animal life or health, and whether it is necessary for such protection. For the 
necessity examination the same four factors must be looked into under subparagraph (b). Here 
it can be mentioned that the impact of the seal regime will be the same as found under 
subparagraph (a). Furthermore it can quickly be stated that animal life and health are 
important values. Under subparagraph (b) one must examine whether the alternatives 
contributes equivalent to the protection of animal life and health. This was done under the 
discussion on TBT Agreement Article 2.2 where we saw that the alternatives equally fulfill, 
here contributes to, the objective.
125
  
The focus under this subparagraph will be the whether the seal regime itself contributes to the 
protection of seal life or health. The objective of reducing the amount of seal hunted, falls 
directly under the wording “protection of … animal life”. The objective of enhancing seal 
welfare falls within the wording “animal …health”.  
As it within the EU already was a prohibition on commercial seal hunt in the Habitats 
Directive, the EU’s pursuit to reduce commercial seal hunt was mainly pointed towards hunt 
outside their territory.
 126
 An additional question to arise under this subparagraph is thus 
whether extraterritorial protection falls under the exception in this subparagraph.
127 
 
5.2.1 Extraterritorial protection of animal life and health 
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This question of whether extraterritorial measures are to be accepted under subparagraph (b) 
has been discussed two times in front of WTO panels, in the two first Tuna-Dolphin 
disputes.
129
 The question there posed was one similar to our dispute; whether a United States 
prohibition on import of Tuna could be allowed based on an objective of protecting dolphin 
life or health outside the territory of the United States. 
Neither of the panels found any guidance in the letter of the law, nor in the objective and 
purpose of the GATT 1994 and Article XX subparagraph (b).
130
 The first panel found 
guidance in the drafting history as it showed that the drafters was concerned mainly by the use 
of sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of animals within the territory and jurisdiction 
of importing country.
131
 In other words the drafting history pointed towards not including 
extraterritorial protection of animal health and life.
132
 The second panel found that the wide 
wording of the article did not exclude extraterritorial jurisdiction.
133 
Another factor in the interpretation of a treaty article is its context. The second panel used the 
wording and practice on subparagraphs (e) and (g) for showing that the article allows certain 
measures to be taken outside the territory of the party taking the measure.   
A case regarding the extraterritoriality within subparagraph (g) was US-Shrimp, where the 
Appellate Body carved out some connection requirements between the object of the 
protection and jurisdiction.
134
 In this case they found that the United States should have some 
jurisdiction over the protection of sea turtles (here as an exhaustible resource after 
subparagraph (g)) because they are “highly migratory animals” and that some were known to 
                                                          
128
 This was also the finding of the Second Panel in United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, paragraphs 
5.31 and 5.31. 
129
Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS21/R (unadopted September 3rd 1991) 
and Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (unadopted June 16th 1994)    
In Panel Report on United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
products, WT/DS381/R the panel did not look into GATT 1994 provisions 
130
 Thorbjørn Daniel Bugge, WTO Adjucation An institutional analysis of adjudicative balancing of interests – 
exemplified with developments in interpretation of GATT Article III and XX, København 2005 pages 419-421 
131
Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS21/R paragraph 5.26 
132
 According to Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Article 32 supplementary means of interpretation are 
preparatory work and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty 
133
 Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (unadopted June 16th 1994), 
paragraphs 5.31 and 5.31. Summary of, under “key finding” 
134




occur in waters over which the United States had jurisdiction. They did not “pass upon the 
question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation”, but concluded that because 
of the specific circumstances in the case there was “sufficient nexus” to allow extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.
135 
In interpreting treaty articles one cannot reach an interpretation that would breach the object 
and purpose of the treaty. The first Panel in the Tuna-Dolphin disputes considered that a too 
wide interpretation of GATT 1994 Article XX subparagraph (b) would lead to the possibility 
of each contracting party determining measures on the protection of life and health of animals, 
measures which other parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their trade rights.
136
 This 
would be against the object of GATT 1994 and of Article XX. This implies that the demand 
to the level of nexus could be higher for subparagraph (b).   
Another factor pointing towards requiring stronger nexus for subparagraph (b) is the fact that 
the sea turtles concerned in US-Turtles were endangered, and preventing species from 
exhaustion must be done across borders. Protecting animal life or health for migrating species 
must also be done across borders, but unlike subparagraph (g); subparagraph (b) was not 
originally intended for protection of animal life and health outside the Member’s jurisdiction.   
It will be outside the extent of this thesis to investigate the migration of the seal species 
hunted for outside the EU. One can however point to that seals are migratory to a certain 
extent. Whether this means that the seals hunted for outside the EU often enough are within 
EU jurisdiction, will depend on the evidence provided to the Panel by the EU. It is here 
difficult to conclude on whether there is “sufficient nexus to allow extraterritorial 
jurisdiction”. As it is for the EU to prove that the objective of protecting seal life or health 
outside the EU is a legitimate objective, it will in the following be presumed that the objective 
of protecting seal life and welfare outside the EU is not a legitimate objective under GATT 
1994 Article XX subparagraph (b). 
As extraterritorial protection is not a legitimate objective here, the seal regime cannot 
contribute to the objective of protecting seal life and health, and the seal regime does not 
fulfill the criteria for invoking the exception. 
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5.3 The chapeau 
 
Because the conclusions above have been based on certain presumptions, it seems necessary 
for providing an overview to include a brief analysis of the chapeau.  
According to the Appellant Body, when applying GATT 1994 Article XX “the measure at 
issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions … it must also 
satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX”
137
.  
The opening clause states that exceptions in the subparagraphs only can be invoked  
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 




In applying the chapeau “a balance must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke 
an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights 
of the other Members.”
138
 It is not certain how the panel will balance the EU’s rights of 
invoking the exceptions on one side, with EU’s obligations to respect Canada’s and Norway’s 
right under WTO agreements. It is plausible that the reasonable availableness of alternatives 
will influence also this balancing. 
Here it will be examined whether the seal regime is applied in a manner that constitutes 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 
As both the protection of public moral and the protection of animal life and health pertain to 
the objective of enhancing seal welfare, it is likely that Canada and Norway will claim that the 
prohibition on trade in the narrow subgroup of seal, is an arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination preventing the EU from invoking subparagraphs (a) and (b). They are likely to 
base such a claim on that products resulting in inhumane treatment and killing of other 
animals are allowed traded within the EU. Further it seems likely that they will claim that for 
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treatment of animals, the same conditions prevail in all countries since the principles of 
animal welfare are universal.
139
 
For finding the seal regime to be means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” the panel 
must find the nature or quality of the discrimination to be graver than simply constituting a 
violation of another GATT 1994 article.
140
 
It is plausible to find the focus on a narrow subgroup, to be an “arbitrary and unjustifiable” 
discrimination against the few countries practicing seal hunt, since the hunt has been found to 
be in accordance with international sustainable management principles and in accordance with 




The EU cannot invoke the exceptions in GATT Article XX.  
When the EU cannot invoke the exceptions in GATT Article XX, it is not necessary in this 
thesis to examine whether the exceptions could have been invoked for EU’s obligations under 
Agriculture Agreement Article 4.2 in this dispute. Nor is it necessary here to examine whether 
exceptions like those in GATT 1994 Article XX could be invoked for nullifying EU’s 
obligations under TBT Agreement Article 2.2 as the exceptions that may lay there, does not 
go beyond the exceptions in GATT 1994 Article XX. 
                                                          
139
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6.The EU seal regime as inconsistent with EU’s obligations under WTO law 
 
In the foregoing it was concluded that the seal regime is contrary to EU’s obligations under 
the TBT Agreement Article 2.2, the Agricultural Agreement Article 4.2 and GATT 1994 
Article XI. It was not found proven that the seal regime is inconsistent with the non-
discrimination obligations in TBT Agreement Article 2.1 and GATT 1994 article I:1 and III:4. 
In this final part it will be speculated in how the panel will decide the dispute, and the 
consequences of the panel’s findings.  
 
6.1 “European Communities - Various Measures on Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products” in front of the panel  
 
The questions posed in this thesis are based on thorough investigations of earlier case law and 
the panel is likely to pose the same questions as posed in this thesis under the same 
provisions. The dispute in front of the panel will be more enlightened by facts as the parties 
provide evidence for their claims. Because of this, the subsumption might in parts differ from 
the subsumption in this thesis, leading the panel to reach different conclusions. However it is 
plausible that the panel will reach the same main conclusion; notably that the seal regime is 
inconsistent with the EU’s obligations under WTO law. 
The panel is likely to divide the claims by agreements in accordance with normal practice. 
The panel will probably start by examining the claims under the special agreements in 
accordance with the principle of lex specialis. For this dispute this, based on the findings of 
the seal regime to be inconsistent with several provisions, the panel is likely to exercise 
judicial economy and only examine some of the claims, and not examine provisions under all 
three agreements.  
Within the WTO dispute settlement system exercising judicial economy is normal, and the 
practice of judicial economy has been approved by the Appellate Body, as long as the panel 
resolves the dispute in front of it.
141
 A negative consequence of exercising judicial economy is 
that the parties might feel that their arguments and objectives have not been fully taken into 
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consideration. For this dispute the elements of considerations are the similar under all the 
agreements, and there is thus little against the panel exercising judicial economy. 
 
6.2 The WTO consequences if the panel finds the seal regime to be inconsistent with 
EU’s obligations  
 
If the panel finds that the EU has breached its WTO trade obligations, the seal regime will be 
considered to constitute nullification or impairment of Canada’s and Norway’s benefits 
accruing under the WTO agreements, to the extent of the breach.
142
 Pursuant to DSU Article 
19.1 the Panel will, having found the EU to breach its WTO obligations, recommend the DSB 
to request that the EU brings the inconsistent seal regime into conformity with the breached 
WTO obligations. The panel might suggest how the seal regime can be brought into 
conformity, and if so the DSB might include this in their request to the EU.
143
  
If the EU does not comply with the recommendation within a reasonable period of time, the 
DSB can impose trade sanctions on the EU or the EU has to enter into negotiations with 
Canada and Norway for determining a mutually acceptable compensation.
144 
 
6.3 Final remarks 
 
The dispute consists of many sides of interests. Animal welfare groups from all over the 
world, as well as EU citizens are concerned by seal welfare. Even though many of their 
concerns are not based on the realities of seal hunt, some concerns could be reasonable. On 
the other side there are the interests of those economically dependent on the seal hunt, 
claiming that the hunt is practiced in a manner consistent with principles of animal welfare 
and not worse than other common practices of killing animals.
145
 The EU has imposed an 
origin neutral prohibition and has an interest in preserving their ability to legislate on matters 
such as the seal regime, where they find it necessary. Canada and Norway have an interest in 
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being able to decide over their national resources in accordance with the principle of 
sovereignty. For all the concerned the findings of the panel is important. 
Even though the questions posed here have arisen as a consequence of the seal regime, the 
debate on trade in seal has, as mentioned in the introduction, been ongoing since 1983. 
Addressing sensitive issues, for this dispute the weight of animal welfare, has been 
controversial within WTO dispute settlement.
146
 However, for the sake of ending the debate, 
the importance of seal welfare within WTO needs to be defined.  
It is important that the panel, if it finds the seal regime to be inconsistent with WTO law, 
explains the reasons behind its conclusion rather than hiding behind trade law terms and 
obligations. All those fighting for enhanced seal welfare need to understand that the current 
seal regime is not the best way of accomplishing their objective, and that there are less trade-
restrictive measures capable of fulfilling the same objective. If not there might be “a public 
outcry sparked by news paper headlines reporting that the WTO approves of animal 
cruelty”.
147
 Furthermore, since the seal regime is nominally origin neutral and thereby 
nominally non-discriminatory the finding of WTO-inconsistency may be “viewed as 
meddling in domestic regulations, undercutting the WTO’s legitimacy.”
148
  
Hopefully the panel will explain that protection of seal welfare can be a legitimate objective 
for the EU to impose trade restrictions, but that the measures imposed must be consistent with 
the WTO agreements for being acceptable under WTO law. 
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